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Abstract
This note develops a behavioral explanation for the existence of an asym-
metric tax treatment of gains and losses when investors are loss averse. We
find that loss offset rules should be more restrictive for investors which are
(1) more risk averse in case of gains, (2) less risk seeking in case of losses, or
(3) more loss averse. Our findings have important policy implications. Tax
authorities often implement identical loss offset rules for different investor
clienteles. However, there should be specific loss offset rules for investors who
differ in risk attitude as well as in loss aversion.
Keywords: Asymmetric Taxation, Loss Offset Rules, Loss Aversion, Behavioral
Economics
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1 Introduction
Tax authorities around the world make distinctions between the taxation of gains
and losses: If profits exceed expenditures, investors immediately pay taxes. In
contrast, there is no immediate unrestricted tax refund in case of losses. However,
there are loss offset rules which allow an offset of losses with past or future profits.
For example, in the United States, private investors and corporations can carry
forward losses 20 years and back two years.1 Similar restrictions are applied in
many other OECD countries such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and
Japan. In general, such loss offset restrictions affect risk taking and can result in
a distorted demand for risky assets (see Domar and Musgrave, 1944; Richter, 1960;
Stiglitz, 1969; Sandmo, 1989).
Many economists thus argue that tax systems require a symmetric taxation of
gains and losses to avoid a distortion of investment decisions.2 In contrast, there
are some conditions under which a symmetric treatment of gains and losses is no
longer a necessity. For example, Panteghini (2001a,b) show that an asymmetric
taxation may be neutral under investment irreversibility and asymmetric effects of
uncertainty.3 Thus, there is no general agreement on whether gains and losses should
be taxed symmetrically or asymmetrically.
1Empirical evidence from the United States on the importance of loss offset restrictions and the
ability of firms to obtain refunds for tax losses is provided by Altshuler and Auerbach (1990) and
Shevlin (1990).
2Auerbach (1986) shows theoretically that a tax system with a full loss offset, i.e. an immediate
tax refund in case of losses, do not distort investment decisions. According to Bonds and Devereux
(1995), a neutral business tax must treat profits and losses symmetrically even under uncertainty.
In case of capital gains, asymmetric treatment of capital gains and losses “turns the capital gains tax
into a discriminatory tax on investment income” (Ball, 1984, p. 480). Furthermore, an asymmetric
taxation increases the deadweight loss of taxes as investments are riskier under asymmetric taxation
than symmetric treatment of profits and losses (Pirrong, 1995). Using a simulation approach, Majd
and Myers (1987) show that tax asymmetries reduce the profitability of risky investment and can
be the dominant tax effect for stand-alone projects.
3Another dimension affecting the impact of asymmetric taxation is liability of investors when
investing in risky projects. Ewert and Niemann (2010) show that full liability as for sole proprietors
requires symmetric taxation. In contrast, limited liability as for corporations requires asymmetric
taxation of profits and losses.
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We contribute to the literature and this discussion in two ways. First, this
note provides an explanation for the existence of loss offset restrictions (i.e. an
asymmetric taxation of gains and losses) from a behavioral perspective. In a simple
model, we show that tax asymmetries can be justified if investors are assumed to be
loss averse. Archival and experimental studies provide empirical evidence for this
assumption and show that individuals value gains and losses differently (see, for
example, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980; Samuelson and Zeckhauser,
1988; Kahneman et al., 1990; Weber and Camerer, 1998; Odean, 1998).
Second, we show that the degree of loss aversion and risk attitude affect the
degree of a loss offset restriction. Our model predicts that when investors are (1)
more risk averse in case of gains, (2) less risk seeking in case of losses, or (3) more loss
averse, loss offset rules should be more restrictive. This finding has important policy
implications. Loss offset rules should take into account the substantial heterogeneity
in risk attitude and loss aversion across investors. For example, risk attitude and
loss aversion differ between income groups, gender (for example Schmidt and Traub,
2002; Brooks and Zank, 2005; Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Calvet et al., 2009a,b; Croson
and Gneezy, 2009; Dohmen et al., 2011), and more generally between corporations
with limited liability and investors with unlimited liability (Gollier et al., 1997).
From a fiscal perspective, the asymmetric taxation of gains and losses has some
desirable effects. Lee and Sung (2007) document that tax revenues in OECD as well
as non-OECD countries are pro-cyclical. More specifically, tax authorities collect
higher taxes when the economy does well and receive less taxes during economic
crises. This pro-cyclicality of tax collections is mitigated if tax authorities only allow
loss carry forwards as opposed to giving an immediate tax refund. This effectively
lowers budget deficits during economic crises and allows more government spending.
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses the implications of our results for existing
tax systems. The final section provides a conclusion.
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2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we provide a simple theoretical framework which explains the ex-
istence of loss offset restrictions from a behavioral perspective. We consider an
investor who invests I in a risky asset with a positive outcome C. The profit from
this investment is π = I − C. Depending on the state of nature, the investor either
generates a gain (I < C) or a loss (I > C). The potential gain πg = x and the
potential loss πl = −x (x > 0) are assumed to be symmetric. Both state of natures
occur with equal probability. The utility function u(π) of the investor has three
main features (see, for example, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Abdellaoui et al.,
2007): (1) risk aversion in case of gains, (2) risk seeking in case of losses, and (3)
loss aversion, i.e. the utility function is steeper for losses than for gains. Figure 1
illustrates a utility function with these characteristics where π = 0 (I = C) serves
as the reference point.
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Figure 1: Utility of gains and losses
In the following, we focus on the effect of profit taxation on individual’s utility.
As our purpose is neither the derivation of a general equilibrium on risky asset mar-
kets nor the definition of an optimal taxation, we assume the decision to introduce
profit taxes to be exogenous. The motivation of tax authorities to raise taxes is man-
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ifold: providing public goods (fiscal purpose), introducing or maintaining an income
transfer system (redistribution), or governing the behavior of taxpayers (allocation).
In our setting, we use a proportional tax with a potential loss offset restriction.
Profits are taxed at the constant rate τ+. In case of losses a tax refund is granted
at the constant rate τ− with 0 < τ+, τ− < 1. The after-tax payoff xτ in our setting
is (1− τ+)x in case of a gain and −(1− τ−)x in case of a loss.
First, we consider the case of a symmetric taxation of gains and losses (τ+ =
τ−), i.e. there is an immediate full loss offset. Profit taxation decreases utility by
u (x)− u
(
xτ
+
)
in case of gains and increases utility by u
(
−xτ−
)
− u (−x) in case
of losses. In general, loss aversion leads to u (x) − u
(
xτ
+
)
< u
(
−xτ−
)
− u (−x).
The increase in utility in case of losses is larger than the decline in utility in case of
gains. This implies that a profit tax which treats gains and losses symmetrically is
asymmetric in terms of utility.
If we assume that the tax authority intends to treat both situations symmetri-
cally in terms of utility for reasons of anti-discrimination and equality, gains and
losses need to be taxed asymmetrically. This assumption justifies that we follow
the concept of equal absolute sacrifice (Richter, 1983). To ensure an identical ab-
solute shift in utility in case of gains and losses, the tax authority has two options:
(1) increasing τ+ while keeping τ− constant or (2) decreasing τ− while keeping τ+
constant. Both options effectively restrict the offset of losses. In the following, we
focus on the latter option only.4 To ensure symmetry in terms of utility, the offset
of losses should then be restricted to τˆ− such that (see also Figure 1)
u (x)− u
(
xτ
+
)
= u
(
−xτˆ−
)
− u (−x) (1)
To analytically derive values for τˆ−, we first focus on a utility function with
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and second on a utility function with con-
stant absolute risk aversion (CARA). We use the two-part power value function of
4Our results are qualitatively identical when increasing τ+ while keeping τ− constant.
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Tversky and Kahneman (1992) as an example for the CRRA function:
u (π) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
πα π ≥ 0
−λ (−π)β π < 0
(2)
The empirical observation that utility is concave in case of gains and convex
in case of losses is characterized by 0 < α, β < 1 (Abdellaoui et al., 2007). As
the utility function is usually closer to a linear function for losses than for gains
(Ko¨bberling and Wakker, 2005), we constrain our analyses to α ≤ β. If an investor
is risk neutral, α and β equal 1. The parameter λ ≥ 1 controls for loss aversion
and is greater than unity for a loss averse investor. From Equation (1) and (2), we
derive τˆ−CRRA for the Tversky/Kahneman utility function as:
τˆ−CRRA = 1−
1
x
[
λxβ − xα + ((1− τ+) · x)α
λ
] 1
β
(3)
As discussed by Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005), a CRRA utility function entails
the existence of u (x) > |u (−x) | when α = β for small x. Consequently, for small x
and λ close to unity, τˆ−CRRA can exceed τ
+. In all other cases which are in line with
empirical observations, we find that τˆ−CRRA < τ
+. That is, we should treat gains and
losses differently and in our case, the offset of losses should thus be restricted. As the
utility function from Equation (2) contradicts empirical evidence of u (x) < |u (−x) |
for small x, we additionally analyze an exponential utility function (EUF) with a
constant (increasing) absolute (relative) risk aversion:
u (π) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1−e−μπ
μ
π ≥ 0, μ = 0
λ
(
eνπ−1
v
)
π < 0, ν = 0
(4)
Similar to the CRRA function, we assume that 0 < ν ≤ μ and λ ≥ 1. Conse-
quently, the utility function from Equation (4) reflects loss aversion (λ ≥ 1) and is
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concave for gains (μ > 0), convex for losses (ν > 0), and closer to a linear function
for losses than for gains (ν < μ). If μ or ν are very close to zero, the utility function
is close to a linear function. The EUF ensures that u (x) < |u (−x) | for all x. From
Equation (1) and (4), we derive τˆ−CARA as:
τˆ−CARA = 1 +
1
νx
ln
[
ν
λμ
(
e−μ(1−τ
+)x − e−μx
)
+ e−νx
]
< τ+ (5)
Equation (5) and in general cases Equation (3) imply that the tax rate on losses
(τ−) is lower than the tax rate on gains (τ+). Hence, tax authorities should tax
gains and losses asymmetrically to ensure an identical absolute shift in utility in
case of gains and losses. Based on these results, we can formulate:
Proposition 1 If an investor is risk averse in case of gains, risk seeking in case
of losses and loss averse, tax authority should tax gains and losses asymmetrically
such that τ− < τ+.
This proposition contradicts results of previous studies which demand a sym-
metric taxation of gains and losses to avoid a distortion of investment decisions
(see, for example, Ball, 1984; Auerbach, 1986; Bonds and Devereux, 1995; Pirrong,
1995). However, there are also theoretical papers which show that an asymmetric
tax treatment of gains and losses is no longer a necessity under certain conditions
such as investment irreversibility, uncertainty, or limited liability (see, for example,
Panteghini, 2001a,b; Ewert and Niemann, 2010).
We next analyze how changes in risk attitude and loss aversion affect τˆ−. Follow-
ing Equation (3) and (5), the extent of loss offset restriction depends on the degree
of risk aversion in case of gains, risk seeking in case of losses, and loss aversion for a
given x. First, we consider the influence of a lower degree of risk aversion for gains.
This implies an increase in α for the CRRA utility function and a decrease in μ for
the CARA utility function. The remaining parameters of the utility functions are
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kept constant. The first derivatives of τˆ− with respect to α and μ are:
∂τˆ−CRRA
∂α
= −ϑ
1
β
−1
xβλ
[((
1− τ+) x)α ln ((1− τ+) x)− xα ln x]  0 (6)
∂τˆ−CARA
∂μ
=
1
xξλμ2
[
μx
(
e−μx − (1− τ+) e−μ(1−τ+)x)+ e−μx − e−μ(1−τ+)x] < 0 (7)
where ϑ = λx
β−xα+((1−τ+)·x)α
λ
> 0 and 0 < ξ = ν
λμ
(
e−μ(1−τ
+)x − e−μx
)
+ e−νx < 1.
As u(x) can exceed −u(−x) for rather small x, ∂τˆ−CRRA
∂α
can be below zero. However,
∂τˆ−CRRA
∂α
is positive in general cases. Assuming the latter, a lower degree of risk
aversion in case of gains leads to an increase of τˆ−. For the CARA utility function,
∂τˆ−CARA
∂μ
is always negative. Hence, a decline in μ which implies a lower degree of risk
aversion leads to an increase of τˆ−. From Equation (7) and in general cases from
Equation (6), we can conclude that if an investor is less risk averse in case of gains,
the asymmetry in the taxation of gains and losses should decrease for this investor.
Second, we analyze the influence of a lower degree of risk seeking in case of
losses—an increase (decrease) of β (ν) for the CRRA (CARA) utility function—on
τˆ−. The respective derivatives are:
∂τˆ−CRRA
∂β
= −ϑ
1
β
−1
xβ2
(
xβ ln xβ − ϑ lnϑ)  0 (8)
∂τˆ−CARA
∂ν
=
1
xν2
(
1− ln ξ − e
−νx
ξ
(1 + νx)
)
> 0 (9)
The effect of such a change in risk attitude is again ambiguous for the CRRA
utility function. However,
∂τˆ−CRRA
∂β
is below zero in general cases. Hence, τˆ−CRRA
decreases in the degree of risk seeking. The first derivative of τˆ−CARA with respect
to ν is above zero. Therefore, a lower degree of risk seeking requires a lower τˆ−.
For both utility functions, we can conclude that if an investor is less risk seeking in
case of losses, the asymmetric taxation of gains and losses should increase for this
investor.
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Finally, we analyze the effect of loss aversion (λ) on τˆ−. The first derivatives for
both utility functions are:
∂τˆ−CRRA
∂λ
= − ϑ
xβλ2
[
xα − ((1− τ+) x)α] < 0 (10)
∂τˆ−CARA
∂λ
= − 1
xξλ2μ
(
e−μ(1−τ
+)x − e−μx
)
< 0 (11)
We find a negative relation between τˆ− and λ for both CRRA and CARA utility
functions. That is, a lower degree of loss aversion increases τˆ−. Hence, the degree of
asymmetric tax treatment of gains and losses should increase in loss aversion. More
(less) loss averse investors should be granted a more (less) restrictive loss offset.
This effect points in the same direction as a lower degree of risk aversion in case of
gains and in the opposite direction as a lower degree of risk seeking in case of losses.
Although the exact magnitude of each effect is unclear, we can draw some con-
clusions on the overall effect of a variation in risk attitude and loss aversion. We
consider two investors A and B and assume that A’s risk preference is closer to risk
neutrality than B’s. More specifically, investor A is less risk averse in case of gains
and less risk seeking in case of losses than B. Furthermore, we assume that A is
less loss averse than B. As a change in risk attitude most likely affects risk aversion
in case of gains and risk seeking in case of losses to the same extent, the effect of
a lower degree of risk aversion in case of gains on the degree of tax asymmetry is
approximately identical with the effect of a lower degree of risk seeking in case of
losses. Hence, the effect of a variation in risk attitude on the different tax treatment
of gains and losses is only marginal. The degree of loss aversion is the dominating
effect and justifies a different tax treatment of both investors. As the degree of
tax asymmetry of gains and losses increases in the degree of loss aversion, gains and
losses of investor A should be taxed less asymmetrically than B’s.5 More specifically,
5Even if two investors have identical risk attitudes in case of gains and losses but differ with
respect to loss aversion, the tax authority should tax gains and losses of the investor with the lower
degree of loss aversion less asymmetrically.
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investor A should be granted more generous loss offset provisions than investor B.
These arguments lead to our second proposition:
Proposition 2 If an investor A is closer to risk neutrality in case of gains and
losses and less loss averse than an investor B, the tax authority should tax gains
and losses of A less asymmetrically than B’s.
3 Implications for Fiscal Policy
We next turn to the implications of our propositions for fiscal policy. In line with
Proposition 1, tax authorities around the world make distinctions between gains
and losses. In particular, a tax is always levied if taxable income of an investor or a
company is positive. In contrast, no tax authority allows an immediate unrestricted
loss offset when expenditures are higher than revenues. A few countries allow a
carryback of losses which may induce an immediate and full tax refund if profits of
preceding years are considerably high to offset current losses. Usually, the use of loss
carryback is restricted in time: Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, South Korea, Japan,
Singapore, the United Kingdom allow carrybacks for only one year, the United States
for two years, and Canada for three years. France allows a carryback for three years
but only grants a tax credit and not an immediate tax refund. Remaining losses
must be carried forward.
Even if a carryback of losses is not permitted, most countries allow a carry
forward of losses to offset current losses against future profits. However, many tax
authorities restrict the carry forward to a certain time period, for example five years
in Greece or Portugal, seven years in Japan, nine years in the Netherlands, or twenty
years in Canada and the United States. Only some countries such as Germany,
Ireland, or the United Kingdom allow an unlimited loss carry forward. All these
rules lower effective tax rates on losses and result in an asymmetric taxation of gains
and losses in accordance with Proposition 1.
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However, loss offset rules do not take into account the heterogeneity in risk atti-
tude and loss aversion across investors (Proposition 2). Carryback and carry forward
rules are often identical for all investors such as sole proprietors and corporations.
For example, the German as well as the Austrian tax authority limits loss carryovers
to identical thresholds for personal income tax and corporate tax purposes.6 Ac-
cording to Proposition 2, the design of loss offset rules should consider the investor’s
risk attitude as well as the degree of loss aversion. In sum, the refund of losses
should be restricted but these limitations should differ with respect to risk attitude
and loss aversion. We next discuss three possible dimensions of differences in loss
offset restrictions.
First, income and wealth have an influence on both risk attitude and loss aver-
sion. Dhar and Zhu (2006) and Calvet et al. (2009a,b) show that wealthy investors
and individuals with higher income exhibit a lower disposition effect. That is, in-
vestors tend to hold losing investments too long and sell winning investments too
early (see Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998). This finding can be explained
by a “S”–shaped value function as in the prospect theory according to which the
utility function is steeper for losses than for gains. Consequently, if an investor ex-
hibits the disposition effect to any degree, Proposition 1 holds and he should face
an asymmetric tax treatment of gains and losses.
If an investor A exhibits a lower disposition effect than investor B, the difference
in absolute values between the utility from a loss and the utility from a gain is lower
for investor A than for B, i.e. |u(−xA)| − u(xA) < |u(−xB)| − u(xB). To put it
differently, our conditions for a less asymmetric tax treatment of gains and losses
(Proposition 2) are in line with a lower disposition effect of an investor. In our
case, loss offset rules should be less restrictive for investor A than for investor B.
High income and wealthy investors should thus be taxed less asymmetrically than
6More specifically, the German tax authority limits the amount of losses carried back (e 511,500)
and forward (only 60% of profits exceeding e 1,000,000). Austrian investors can only offset losses
up to 75% of their gross income in one year. In both countries, these limits are identical for
corporations, sole proprietors and private investors.
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low income and low wealth investors as the former (latter) exhibit a lower (higher)
disposition effect.
Second, demographic characteristics such as gender and age also affect risk at-
titude and loss aversion. In a recent study, Dohmen et al. (2011) document that
women are less willing to take risk than men (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for a de-
tailed literature overview). Using experimental settings, Schmidt and Traub (2002)
and Brooks and Zank (2005) show that women are additionally more loss averse
than men. Empirical evidence thus suggests that the conditions of our Proposition
2 are fulfilled with respect to gender. Consequently, men should be taxed less asym-
metrically than women. With respect to age, Dhar and Zhu (2006) find that older
individuals exhibit a lower disposition effect. Following the arguments from above,
the fiscal authority should thus tax older investors less asymmetrically than younger
investors.
Finally, risk taking differs between corporations and private investors. Investors
who merge into a corporation are able to diversify their risky positions. The degree
of diversification increases in the number of investors participating in a corporation.
Thus, a group of investors acts more risk neutral as they have more risk diversifica-
tion opportunities. In contrast, a sole proprietor without the opportunity to diversify
or with a lower ability of risk diversification is more risk averse. Additionally, li-
ability differs between legal organizational forms. Gollier et al. (1997) show that
optimal risk exposure is larger under limited (as for corporations) than under full
liability (as for sole proprietors). Corporations can thus be seen as more risk neutral
in case of gains and losses as well as less loss averse than sole investors. According to
Proposition 2, loss offset provisions should be more generous for corporations than
for private investors.7
7A general assumption in a variety of theoretical models is that corporate investors are risk
neutral and not loss averse. Under these assumptions, τˆ− is equal to τ+ for both CARA and
CRRA utility functions and, thus, the tax authority should grant an immediate unrestricted tax
refund in case of losses. Assuming that private investors are not risk neutral but loss averse,
τ+ exceeds τˆ−. Hence, loss offset should be restricted for sole proprietors, but not for corporate
investors.
11
4 Conclusion
We offer new insights on the existence of asymmetric taxation of gains and losses.
From a behavioral perspective, we provide an explanation why tax authorities should
restrict loss offsets. We show that if investors are more risk averse (seeking) in case
of gains (losses), loss offset rules should be more (less) restrictive. Furthermore,
a higher degree of loss aversion has a positive impact on loss offset restrictions.
Tax authorities should thus take into careful consideration the differences in risk
attitude and loss aversion across investor groups (for example corporations versus
private investors, female versus male investors, or low versus high income investors).
For example, loss offset rules should be more generous for well diversified investors
(corporations or wealthy investors) than for less diversified investors (sole proprietors
or low income investors). Our findings have important policy implications as tax
authorities in (almost) all countries do not implement such distinctions.
There are several ways of implementing loss offset restrictions: One could (i)
introduce investor specific annual loss offset limits, (ii) restrict the use of carrybacks
and carry forwards to time periods that differ across investors or (iii) define specific
loss offset rules for different income baskets. The asymmetric taxation of gains and
losses can further mitigate the pro-cyclical nature of corporate tax revenues (see Lee
and Sung, 2007). If firms are not entitled an immediate full loss offset, tax revenues
are smoother and less pro-cyclical. This lowers budget deficits during economic
crises and increases opportunities for government spending.
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